Stress Tests in Commodity Markets by Mattos, Fabio
University of Nebraska - Lincoln
DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln
Cornhusker Economics Agricultural Economics Department
2014
Stress Tests in Commodity Markets
Fabio Mattos
University of Nebraska-Lincoln, fmattos@unl.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/agecon_cornhusker
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Agricultural Economics Department at DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska -
Lincoln. It has been accepted for inclusion in Cornhusker Economics by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska -
Lincoln.
Mattos, Fabio, "Stress Tests in Commodity Markets" (2014). Cornhusker Economics. 624.
http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/agecon_cornhusker/624
CORNHUSKER
ECONOMICS
University of Nebraska–Lincoln Extension
March 12, 2014
Institute of Agriculture & Natural Resources
Department of Agricultural Economics
http://agecon.unl.edu/cornhuskereconomics
Stress Tests in Commodity Markets
Market Report
Yr 
Ago
4 Wks
Ago 3/7/14
Livestock and Products,
 Weekly Average
Nebraska Slaughter Steers,
  35-65% Choice, Live Weight. . . . . . . . . .
Nebraska Feeder Steers, 
  Med. & Large Frame, 550-600 lb.. . . . . .
Nebraska Feeder Steers,
  Med. & Large Frame 750-800 lb. . . . . . .
Choice Boxed Beef, 
  600-750 lb. Carcass. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Western Corn Belt Base Hog Price
  Carcass, Negotiated. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Pork Carcass Cutout, 185 lb. Carcass,       
  51-52% Lean.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Slaughter Lambs, Ch. & Pr., Heavy,
  Wooled, South Dakota, Direct. . . . . . . . .
National Carcass Lamb Cutout,
  FOB. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
$128.00
162.57
142.09
195.02
71.95
79.04
105.00
289.23
$140.48
209.49
169.22
216.30
82.97
90.15
160.25
369.43
$149.52
221.09
177.70
233.40
105.44
108.08
158.00
369.88
Crops, 
 Daily Spot Prices
Wheat, No. 1, H.W.
  Imperial, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Corn, No. 2, Yellow
 Nebraska City, bu.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Soybeans, No. 1, Yellow
 Nebraska City, bu.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Grain Sorghum, No. 2, Yellow
  Dorchester, cwt. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Oats, No. 2, Heavy
  Minneapolis, MN , bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
6.87
7.39
14.96
12.25
4.28
6.19
4.27
13.08
7.48
4.30
6.83
4.56
14.22
8.07
4.61
Feed
Alfalfa, Large Square Bales, 
  Good to Premium, RFV 160-185
  Northeast Nebraska, ton. . . . . . . . . . . . .
Alfalfa, Large Rounds, Good
  Platte Valley, ton. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Grass Hay, Large Rounds, Good
  Nebraska, ton. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Dried Distillers Grains, 10% Moisture, 
  Nebraska Average. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Wet Distillers Grains, 65-70% Moisture,     
  Nebraska Average. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
+      
227.50
212.50
268.00
103.50
+      
130.00
107.50
185.00
61.00
162.50
127.50
107.50
235.00
67.00
+ No Market
In the last few months (Cornhusker Economics,
12/04/2013, 12/11/2013 and 2/12/2014), we talked about
different ways to think about price risk in the soybean and
corn markets. More specifically, two of the most popular
risk measures that focus on potential losses: value-at-risk
(VaR) and expected shortfall (ES), were discussed. The
VaR shows the maximum loss for a given probability
during a certain period of time. For example, the VaR for
corn in Aug/05-May/13 was -5.62 percent, meaning that
there was a 99 percent chance that the daily price change
in the corn market would not exceed -5.62 percent, i.e.,
prices would not drop more than -5.62 percent in 99 out of
100 days. A follow-up question is “How much can we lose
in that one day (out of 100 days) when prices drop more
than 5.62 percent?” The ES answers this question by
showing the average price change when the market goes
beyond the VaR value. The ES complements the VaR, and
both measures can be used together. In Aug/05-May/13 the
ES for corn was -6.89 percent, i.e., in the one percent of
the days when prices dropped more than the VaR
estimated, the average price change was -6.89 percent.
The information above is relevant for the future as
long as one assumes that future market conditions will be
similar to what happened in the corn market in 2005-2013.
This raises an important issue. This may be a dangerous
assumption, since the behavior of prices has not been
constant over time – which brings us to the point of
today’s discussion. Historical data can still be used as a
reference for risk measures, but it is recommended to also
use stress tests with the estimates. A stress test is
essentially an exercise to explore how changes in market
conditions affect our estimates for VaR and ES. Stress
tests are especially useful during crisis situations when
abnormal events happen and usual market relationships no
longer hold.
Going back to our study of the corn market between
Aug/05-May/13, the daily average of all percentage price
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changes in that period was 0.05 percent. Recall that
percentage price changes are calculated as the change in
price between today and yesterday, divided by yesterday’s
price. For example, if today’s price is $4.80/bu and
yesterday’s price was $4.77/bu, the price change is
$0.03/bu, and the percentage price change is 0.03/4.77 =
0.0063 = 0.63 percent (i.e., today’s price of $4.80/bu is 0.63
percent higher than yesterday’s price of $4.77/bu). In
addition, volatility was 2.14 percent in the same period. We
can use these numbers as a baseline scenario to run a simple
example of a stress test. Let’s see what would happen to our
VaR and ES estimates if the average percentage price
change was lower and the volatility was higher. For the
percentage price change, let’s make it negative and then
double it, i.e., we’ll work with an average percentage price
change of –0.10 percent instead of +0.05 percent. And we’ll
also double the volatility, making it 4.28 percent rather than
2.14 percent. Table 1 exhibits what VaR and ES would be
under these different scenarios. In the first row we see our
baseline scenario, reflecting actual market conditions
observed in Aug/05–May/13 (VaR = -5.61 percent and ES
= -6.89 percent). The second row assumes a lower average
percentage price change of –0.10 percent but still keeps the
same baseline volatility, resulting in a slightly higher VaR
and ES (-5.77 and -7.04 percent, respectively). The third
row considers the higher volatility of 4.28 percent but
maintains the baseline average price change, now causing
a significant increase in VaR and ES (-11.29 and -13.82
percent, respectively). Finally, in the last row we have both
alternative scenarios (lower price change and higher
volatility), yielding another increase in VaR and ES
estimates (-11.44 and -13.97 percent, respectively).
The analysis above demonstrates one method to run a
stress test. We take a given time period as a baseline
scenario and explore how our variables of interest (in this
case, VaR and ES) would change under different
alternative scenarios. For example, if we believe that the
next few years will have lower average percentage price
changes (–0.10%) and/or higher volatility (4.28%)
compared to Aug/05–May/13, then Table 1 shows all the
possible combinations for our VaR and ES estimates for
the near future.
There are still other approaches to stress tests. We can
also focus on specific events that have already been
observed in the past. They can be either events that happen
with some frequency over time (such as changes in
government programs), or events that are rare but much
more significant if they occur (such as a drought like in
2012). For example, what if there is another drought like
the one in 2012 within the next three years? What would
happen to grain prices? And just as importantly, if I am a
grain producer, how will such an event affect my
production and marketing plans? What should I do to
prepare for it? What should I do to recover after it?
Another approach to stress testing concentrates on
hypothetical events that usually have not occurred before.
This does not necessarily mean that we can make up
anything here. Ideally, we want to explore reasonable
events that have never happened before. An example is the
current political situation in the Ukraine. As far as we
know, there is no clear indication that it has significantly
affected grain markets in the country. But what if the
situation deteriorates to the point of compromising the sale
of Ukrainian grain to other countries? How would inter-
national grain prices react to such an event?
The discussion above suggests that the implementation
of stress tests is not always simple. Several important
decisions are necessary to run a stress test:  the time frame 
of the analysis; what variables we want  to  explore;  and 
 
Table 1. Stress Test for VaR and ES Estimates in the Corn Market
Scenarios VaR ES
Baseline Scenario (Aug/05-May/13)
     average price change = +0.05%
     volatility = 2.14%
-5.61% -6.89%
Lower Price Changes + Baseline Volatility
     average price change = -0.10%
     volatility = 2.14%
-5.77% -7.04%
Higher Volatility + Baseline Price Changes
     average price change = +0.05%
     volatility = 4.28%
-11.29% -13.82%
Lower Price Changes + Higher Volatility
     average price change = -0.10%
     volatility = 4.28%
-11.44% -13.97%
how many alternative scenarios we want to consider,
among others. Note that the number of calculations and
potential outcomes can increase rapidly if we explore more
variables of interest and keep adding new alternative
scenarios. This can make the process longer and harder to
analyze. In addition, there is often the challenge of
imagining alternative scenarios and their magnitudes.
Trying to envision events that never occurred before is
especially complex. It is not easy to anticipate an event
that has never happened before, and then evaluate how
markets will react to this never-before-seen event.
Despite the challenges to implementing stress tests,
they can be very useful as a tool to disseminate
information and quantify potential losses under different
scenarios. Note that stress tests do not always give us
precise answers, and in many cases this is not their main
purpose. Sometimes stress tests can be more useful as an
exercise to help us think carefully about our strategies
related to marketing, risk management, etc. This is a very
important point about stress tests. The simple fact that we
are considering different scenarios, thinking carefully
about their implications to our businesses, and evaluating
how prepared we are to deal with them can provide more
important insights than the actual number generated at the
end of the stress test.
Doing stress testing exercises in a systematic way can
help us identify potential flaws in our strategies that might
have been underestimated or overlooked, and then adjust
them accordingly. We cannot predict the future and may
not be able to accurately estimate what will happen under
distinct scenarios, but thinking carefully about how
different events can affect our businesses and being
prepared for them already gives us a competitive
advantage. As the scientist Louis Pasteur used to say,
“Chance favors the prepared mind.”
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